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JOURNAL OF ACTUARIAL PRACTICE

Discussion of Patrick Butler's
"Cost-Based Pricing of Individual Automobile Risk
Transfer: Car-Mile Exposure Unit Analysis"
Ruy A. Cardoso*

Aside from its hyperacademic title, Patrick Butler's paper on
mileage and merit rating of automobile insurance policies provides a
nice twist to an old model and a reasonably compelling theoretical
argument for the use of mileage as a rating variable. Yet one basic
real world truth runs counter to Dr. Butler's view: automobile insurance companies generally do not use mileage as a rating variable,
except in the broadest of categories. This is despite the fact that
Dorweiler's justification for the use of mileage has been around for
more than 60 years.
Because it generally is conceded that classification schemes have
become more refined over time in response to competition, why
haven't insurers already gone down the path to which Dr. Butler
points? I can suppose two reasons: (1) competition doesn't really work;
or (2) competition does work and the competitive market finds the
use of mileage to be wanting in some respect. In my opinion, the second reason is more likely to be true.
Assuming this second reason is correct, then either the demand for
or the supply of mileage rating is too low for it to be used more than
it is. On the demand side, it is possible that insurance company customers don't like the notion of having their odometers inspected or of
adding an uncertain level of premiums to their already complicated
lives; after all, the purpose of insurance is to replace uncertain losses
with certain, not uncertain, premiums. On the supply side, the costs
of administering a system such as that proposed by Dr. Butler simply

* Ruy Cardoso, FCA5,
FCAS, MAAA, currently is vice president and chief actuary of the
Automobile Insurers Bureau of Massachusetts where he represents the Massachusetts
automobile insurance industry in regulatory hearings concerning insurance rates. Mr.
Cardoso previously has heId consulting and insurance company positions whose
primary focus was the analysis of casualty insurance loss reserves. He graduated from
S.B. in management science.
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1983 with an 5.B.
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may outweigh the benefits; I am unaware of any administrative cost
studies that would illuminate the answer to this particular question.
Beyond pointing out this basic conflict between theory and practice, I would like to make the following observations on Dr. Butler's
analysis:

•

•

•

•

While there is likely to be at least some correlation between
variation in mileage and variation in claim frequency within a
class, the Butler analysis essentially assumes a perfect correlation, disregarding the legion of unmeasurable factors that could
account for as much variation as does mileage; Dr. Butler's numerical results should be tempered considerably, therefore, before
being used in the real world;
Dr. Butler is clearly in the right when he notes that the per mile
expected risk transfer cost only can be determined if real carmiles of exposure are determined. Any study based on mileage
mnes
data reported by either insurers or insureds is subject to question.
In the former case, this may be due to insurer indifference in
reporting correct statistical data when no premium effect is
involved. In the latter case, this may be due to insureds' incentive to cheat. Here in Massachusetts, where I currently am
employed, we have found that nearly 30% of policies have estimated future annual mileage of zero recorded; on the other hand,
nearly 50% of policies have estimated future annual mileage of
magnitudes too high to qualify for any rate discount, making it
like1y that these estimates are unaffected by cheating;
Again, here in Massachusetts, we have found some evidence of a
relationship between annual mileage estimates (which are based
on questionable data, as explained above) and merit rating classification under the merit rating scheme used here; in particular,
the higher rated (worse) drivers do tend to have higher mileage
estimates, in keeping with Dr. Butler's thesis; and
Finally, Dr. Butler's point (in his section 11) that "Applying a
recent claim surcharge to the cents-per-mile class price, however,
would constitute a deliberate, random, and unjustifiable increase"
seems to argue for the complete elimination of merit rating,
which the paper does not justify. As anyone who has listened to
a radio talk show can attest, at least some part of the driving
public demands merit rating as a way of punishing those perceived as offenders (unless, of course, the caner is one of those on
the receiving end of a surcharge, in which case he or she would
look on Dr. Butler's article quite favorably). Talk show callers
aside, the potential relationship between merit rating classification and other unmeasured vanables (aside from mileage) cannot
be dismissed based solely on this article, nor can the virtuallyimpossible-to-measure deterrence effects of a merit rating scheme.

In summary, Dr. Butler's article, while not quite supportive of all
of his conclusions, does make plain the problem of random incidence.
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The principle that "cars driven more than class-average miles are
over represented in the accident sample" is one that I expect many
practicing actuaries frequently forget. I recall an analogous phenomenon from an undergraduate probability class; if one surveys subway riders at random and asks how many days per month they ride
the subway, the average answer will be too high an estimate of the
population mean because the survey-taker more likely will encounter
persons who are frequently on the subway. Of course, if we all rode
the subway every day, the incidence problem would go away, as
would much of the need for cars and the corresponding mileage and
merit rating issues. If Dr. Butler is not starting his own insurance
company soon, perhaps he can devote some time to the advocacy of
better public transportation systems, thereby reducing the problem he
has illustrated so nicely.

Ruy A. Cardoso
Auto Insurers Bureau of MA
Seventh Floor
101 Arch Street
Boston, MA 02110

Richard G. WolI*
The purpose of this paper, according to Patrick Butler, is to
"demonstrate that the car-mile exposure unit is essential to costbased pricing of individual risk transfer." On the basis of his demonstration, Dr. Butler advocates changing the exposure basis for private
passenger automobile insurance from a car-year basis to a per mile
basis. Current auto insurance prices are based on a contract that runs
for a fixed period of time, usually a half year. He argues that the
basis for the insurance contract for most coverages should be changed
to miles driven.
Dr. Butler's demonstration consists of creating a simplified model
where there are three types of insurance customers. The first type: of
customer drives 5,000 miles per year. The second drives 10,000 miles
per year, and the third drives 20,000 miles per year. He assumes
that the risk process for each customer is Poisson with a frequency of

* Richard

G. Woll is research actuary for the Allstate Research and Planning Center
at Menlo Park, California. He is a Fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society, a
member of the American Academy of Actuaries and a member of the Risk Theory
Seminar of the American Risk and Insurance Association (ARIA). His work in
connection with the implementation of a new auto classification plan in California
included analysis of insurance results by miles driven.
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one accident per 100,000 miles. For illustrative purposes, he assumes
that each claim costs $10,000. He then uses this information to generate the dollars of loss experienced by each customer. This allows
him to evaluate the effect of what he calls claim record pricing. This
means establishing prices on the basis of prior claim records. He concludes that claim record pricing does not match prices to costs as well
as charging on the basis of miles driven. He also concludes from this
that "the car-mile exposure unit is essential to cost-based pricing of
individual risk transfer."
Insurance companies currently recognize differences in miles
driven by the use of class factors. Or. Butler argues, however, that:
Modern class plans continue to show very narrow distributions
of cars by base price multiplier in contrast to the range in the
miles driven (Butler, Butler, and Williams, 1988).
Basing insurance prices on the number of miles driven makes intuitive
sense. It is obvious that the difference in rates between two drivers,
other things being equal, should be proportional to the difference in
the miles they drive. The cost of insuring different auto customers,
however, depends not only on how much they drive, but on other factors such as how well they drive, where they drive, and what kind of
car they drive.
In addition, the relationship between the number of miles a customers drives and insurance claims is complex. Or. Butler seems to
assume that customers who drive more than other customers have
proportionately more losses. That is, he expects a customer who
drives 10,000 miles to have twice the losses of a customer who drives
5,000 miles. Allstate's data, however, present a more complicated
picture. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the number of POl
claims per mile and the number of miles driven annually by a cus'tomer. It uses information about the 1991 PO claim experience of
Allstate customers in California. 2
Figure 1 shows the number of PO claims per mile going from 3.5
claims per 100,000 miles for persons who drive about 1,000 miles per
year down to 0.3 claims per 100,000 miles for persons driving 30,000
miles or more. This is in sharp contrast to the constant number of
1 PD (property damage liability) claim frequency is used because it generally has been
found to be the best indicator of underlying accident frequency.
2 Because of the passage of Proposition 103 in California which mandated the use of
mileage in rating automobile policies,
poIlcies, Allstate sent questionnaires to all its customers
to get mileage data. Allstate already had collected mileage information on its
customers, but the questionnaire helped to confirm the information.
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claims per 100,000 miles assumed in Dr. Butler's analysis. This results
in customers who drive about 1,000 miles per year having a claim
frequency of 3.5 claims per year per 100 insured cars while those who
drive over 30,000 miles have a claim frequency
frequency· of about 8.0-a relationship of 2.25 to one, rather than the 30+ to one under Dr. Butler's
assumptions.
When we turn our attention to other risk factors, we find that
mileage is a relatively unimportant source of difference between customers compared to territory and years of driving experience.
Figure 1
PO Claims per Mile by Annual Mileage
Allstate 1991 California Experience
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The effectiveness of any auto insurance risk assessment system
depends on the extent to which it matches insurance prices to insurance costs. Dr. Butler has demonstrated that the use of mileage as an
exposure base in a theoretical world, where all differences in loss
experience come from differences in the number of miles driven, is
more effective than the use of claim record pricing. He has not
demonstrated anything with respect to actual insurance experience.
The effectiveness of automobile insurance risk assessments systems
was discussed extensively many years ago. A study by the Stanford
Research Institute (SRI) in 1976 entitled The Role of Risk
Classifications in Property and Casualty Insurance: A Study of the Risk
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Assessment Process developed a means for evaluating risk assessment
systems by measuring the variance of expected losses of the partitions
each system produces. 3
The most efficient risk assessment system is the one that divides
insurance customers into groups ,with the largest variance in expected
losses. We also can evaluate the relative importance of various risk
classification factors by measuring the percentage of the total variance each factor explains.
Dr. Butler seems to argue that the primary contributor to the
variance of expected losses in the real world is the difference in the
number of miles that each customer drives. There is no evidence presented by Dr. Butler, or by anyone else, to show that this is the case.
The major case made for mileage in the paper is the repeated observation that insurance risk is transferred, mile after mile, by driving.
Using the SRI approach, the Allstate Research and Planning
Center recently conducted a study of risk classification factors in
California. The study covered most of the factors customarily used by
most companies with the exception of vehicle characteristics.
Allstate has collected data on the mileage driven by each customer
since 1981, so the study was able to include mileage. Mileage, years
licensed, and territory explained over 90 percent of the variance of
the classification data included in the study for liability coverages
(bodily injury liability, property damage liability, medical payments, and uninsured motorists). Over 55 percent of the total variance, however, was explained by territorial differences. Years
licensed explained almost 23 percent of the variance, and mileage
explained about 14 percent.
The picture was somewhat different for collision coverage.
Territory, mileage, and years licensed again explained over 90 percent of the variance, but mileage explained over 33 percent of the
total variance, years licensed explained about 30 percent, and territory explained about 26 percent.

3 The SRI report states "First, we define a measure of efficiency. Our probabilistic
model for actual losses separates the random element of actual losses from the
predictable element, the expected loss, that is, claim likelihood and expected claim
severity. A perfectly efficient risk assessment process would be one that estimates
exactly individuals' expected losses. A process with zero efficiency would not resolve
any of the initial expected loss uncertainty. A process with intermediate efficiency
will be characterized by the average fraction of the initial expected loss uncertainty It
resolves" (emphasis added).
The report continues that: "We find it convenient to use variance to measure
uncertainty because of [its) additive property ... In words, the expected loss variance in
an entire population is equal to the sum of the average expected loss variance within
each class and of the variance of the rates (average expected losses) among classes"
(SRI, Supplement, p. 200).
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Insurance customers with less than one year of experience have
the highest losses per car. Losses per car decline each subsequent
year. Thus, persons with more years of driving experience have
improved loss experience. This, in turn, suggests that an important
element in the transfer of insurance risk is how the customer drives.
Territory rates, of course, depend on where insurance customers drive.
The Allstate study indicates clearly that how much its customers
drive is only part of the overall variance of systematic risk. It is
more important than the other two factors for collision insurance, but
still accounts for only about one third of the total variance. It plays
even a smaller role in liability insurance, the major part of auto
insurance costs.
Thus, we do not believe that Dr. Butler has been able "to demonstrate that the car-mile exposure unit is essential to cost-based pricing of individual risk transfer."

Richard G. Wall
Allstate Insurance Co.
Allstate R & P Center
321 Middlefield Road
Menlo Park CA 94025-9765

Author's Reply to Discussion
The discussions by Messrs. Ruy A. Cardoso and Richard G. Woll
question different points in the paper and raise other important
issues concerning automobile insurance exposure units that are outside
the immediate scope of the paper. Responding to these questions not
only calls for expanded consideration of points discussed in the paper,
but also requires examination of further consequences of conversion to
the car-mile exposure unit and of retaining the car-year unit. The
efforts of Mr. Cardoso and Mr. Woll in providing this opportunity
and challenge are appreciated greatly.

Reply to Discussion By Ruy A. Cardoso
Mr. Cardoso's major argument against conversion to the car-mile
exposure unit can be paraphrased as follows: if the car-mile were
judged superior to the car-year by Dorweiler in 1929 and has not been
adopted or even studied since then (over 60 years), then the car-mile
unit must have some unidentified fatal flaw. Specific flaws suggested
by Mr. Cardoso are (1) the technical failure of future mileage as a
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classification variable, (2) the irrelevancy of exposure measurement
because competition prevents overpricing, and (3) customer resistance
to odometer auditing. Upon examining these suggested flaws, however, one finds evidence that the true fatal flaw that has prevented
the use of the car-mile unit is seen only from the perspective of automobile insurers. Adoption of the car-mile unit as an objective standard for measuring transfer of on-the-road risk would curtail price
competition severely for larger-premium consumers with broad insurance needs. It also would end the subsidy for this competition currently paid by consumers transferring less than class average risk per
car-year.
Mr. Cardoso's criticism of mileage as a flawed classification
variable-Le., usable only in broadest categories, insurer indifference
to integrity of data, incentive to cheat-agrees with company rate
hearing testimony previously published; see Butler, Butler, and
Williams (1988, p. 388). The problem with this critique is that it
misses the point: the subject discussed by the current paper, as well as
by the 1929 Dorweiler study, is not classification variables but exposure
units. It is necessary, therefore, to clarify the difference between
variables chosen to define price classes and the price unit chosen as
the unit of purchase to which prices refer.
Gasoline purchase provides a ready analogy to distinguish classification variables from the price unit. Gasoline usually is available
in twelve different price classes. The pricing variables that distinguish these classes are three octane levels, self service or full service,
and cash or credit payment; thus, 3 x 2 x 2 = 12 prices. Yet the gasoline gallon is the unit of purchase common to all of the price classes.
In auto insurance, price classes are defined by variables such as territory, driver characteristics, and use of car. Distinct from such class
definition variables is the price unit; currently the car-year, but
which would be the car-mile after conversion to the car-mile exposure
unit. Although classification variables and the price unit have distinct functions, the choices of which to use for assessing the cost of
risk transfer are influenced strongly by auto insurance price competition.
In suggesting that competition currently prevents insurance overpricing of cars driven less than average, Mr. Cardoso apparently is
taking the well-known fact that competition lowers auto insurance
prices for marketing targets and extrapolating it to the public relations dictum that competition precludes overpricing. There is plentiful evidence, however, that insurers' price competition for customers
with more risk to insure has, as its complementary effect, the overpricing of customers with less risk to insure (what Bailey (1960) calls
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"skimming the cream"). This effect was described in 1911 by the
New York State Legislature's Merritt Committee Report (p. 41) in its
examination of the need for regulation of fire insurance pricing:
In a state of open competition the rates adjust themselves not
to the hazards but largely to the strength of the insured so
that the man of influence, whose patronage is desired, will
get his insurance too cheaply, as against the small man who
is not in a position to drive a sharp bargain. That is, competition results in discrimination.
Automobile rate hearing records contain admissions that costs are
shifted from higher mileage customers to lower mileage customers
and from men to women in response to price competition; see Butler,
Butler, and Williams (1988, p. 405). For example, in 1982 State Farm
testified to the Pennsylvania Insurance Department that in order to
keep the price down for its higher mileage customers, the company
keeps its low mileage discount to about half the size it should be.
State Farm stated:
We're already very competitive on the [lower mileage] class,
and we're generally tight on a competitive standpoint on [the
higher mileage] class, and if we widen the differential,
we're going to hurt ourselves very substantially on the
[higher mileage] class of business.
Later in the hearing the State Farm actuary explained:
We like to follow the statistics where we can. The rating
law talks about rates which are not excessive, inadequate or
unfairly discriminatory, but your rating [law] also talks about
doing nothing to prohibit competition in the marketplace,
and as a matter of fact, we simpfy can't-we just can't always
follow the statistical indications.
Auto insurers not only keep price differences between risk classes
smaller than cost differences to compete for members of the more
costly class, but also merge higher and lower risk classes or do not
divide classes where such groups are distinguishable. In the latter
case, for example, competition for adult men's business explains why
nearly all cars in the adult driver classes are unisex-rated despite
government mileage statistics, backed by accident involvement data,
that show that men's average risk per year is about twice women's
average risk per year. The same accident involvement data are said
77
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to require sex-divided prices for youth classes. Rate-hearing testimony also shows that men's prices may be lowered contrary to experienced cost to allow agents to establish good relations with young
men who are desirable as future sales targets.
Just as competition works to flatten rather than sharpen class differences, resistance to any real measure of exposure differences within
classes also expresses competitive concern for the "man of influence"
at the expense of the "small man." The capacity for miles of driving
is dependent on income level, which generally determines the ability
to buy gasoline and own reliable cars. Because the car-year price unit
is the status quo for insurance, the result of choosing this price unit as
opposed to one that responds to individual cost can be examined by
analogous conversion of the price unit for gasoline from the gallon to
the car-year. That is, what would the consequences be for customers if
gasoline were sold like auto insurance?
With gasoline sold by the car-year, everybody with cars in the
same class would pay a dollars per car-year price based on the cost
per car of supplying gasoline for that class in previous years and
adjusted for expected change in gasoline cost and, as currently done
for auto insurance, any trend toward increased or decreased driving.
Payment in advance for a car-year's worth of gasoline would allow
customers to draw gasoline as needed from the class pool. Sale of
gasoline by the car-year, however, would lead to problems analogous
to the affordability breakdown that occurs in areas where the caryear price of auto insurance is high.
With gasoline prices set to cover the anticipated car-year average cost of each class, above average users of gasoline would experience a decrease in their gasoline expense paid by an increase in gasoline expense for below average users. Once accustomed to the benefits
of unmetered gasoline, the above average user would object to any
expense and accountability that using meters on gasoline pumps would
entail, as Mr. Cardoso observed would occur with the use of odometers to earn insurance premiums. If the increase in annual gasoline cost
per car were to force some below average users to give up cars, however, class average gallons per car-year would rise. A rise in average
consumption would raise the cost of gasoline per car-year and would
force still more below average users to give up their cars, causing the
gasoline cost per car-year to rise even more. This death spiral effect
that results when prices are not tied to a unit of individual consumption first would become apparent where the annual prices are highest, as is happening currently with auto insurance in some urban
areas.
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Surcharging the yearly gasoline bill of every tenth customer in a
class so that the other nine can receive a customer retention discount
would be analogous to the randomness of auto insurance merit rating.
(Although Mr. Cardoso defends merit rating as having possible deterrence effects, customer retention is an obvious purpose. If discounts for
claim free years were really risk-related, eligibility would transfer
between companies. Customers generally are puzzled to discover that
it does not.) With gasoline sold by the gallon instead of the car-year,
however, the classification variables that set prices are certain,
objective, obviously related to a cost that can be evaluated by customers, and not easily manipulated to price discriminate between customers. From the auto insurers' viewpoint, the real fatal flaw in carmile pricing is that it would inhibit cost shifting within classes by
making the cost of individual risk transfer as understandable and
controllable as the gasoline cost of automobile operation.
The public demand for driver-record pricing voiced on call-in
radio talk shows to which Mr. Cardoso refers is a political response
based on the only information available to consumers. Charged by
the car-year, auto insurance is experienced as a flat tax on car ownership at prices based on group characteristics. By appearing to take
the individual into account, driver-record pricing competes, as the
paper notes, with the idea of making the car-mile the price unit for
individual risk transfer.

Reply to Discussion By Richard G. Woll
Two sentences early in Mr. Woll's discussion transform what purports to be a critique of the paper's subject-the car-mile as the price
unit for individual risk transfer-into a critique of a topic that the
paper does not address-the problematic estimated future mileage
discount classes with the car-year as the price unit. (These discounts
are used by some insurers, but were rejected as inherently unenforceable by other insurers after several decades' use; see Butler, Butler,
and Williams (1988, p. 388». "It is obvious," Mr. Woll states, "that
the difference in rates between any two drivers, other things being
equal, should be proportional to the difference in the miles they
drive. The cost of insuring different auto customers, however, depends
not only on how much they drive but on other factors such as how well
they drive, where they drive, and what kind of car they drive."
While the qualifying phrase "other things being equal" in the
first sentence could refer to the purpose of classifications such as
those cited in the second sentence, the word "however" in the second
sentence suggests a rebuttal of the first. Together they seem to imply
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that the amount driven is not a measurement but a factor, i.e. a classification variable arguably related to risk, as are driver experience,
garaging territory, and car type. For the remainder of the discussion,
Mr. Woll criticizes the car-mile exposure unit as if it were a mileage
classification variable (which it is not) to be compared with other
car-year classification variables as has been done in his research at
Allstate.
The basic premise of the paper is that the car-mile must work in
conjunction with risk classification as the exposure unit to measure
the cost of individual risk transfer. The abstract states that odometer
miles multiply "a cents-per-mile rate based on class experience" and
that the "per mile cost of individual risk transfer is a class property." The essential relationship of individual exposure measurement
to risk classification is emphasized in every section. It is from this
perspective that the main issues raised by Mr. Woll will be
addressed. These issues are within-class proportionality of cost to
miles driven; observed decreasing claim rates per mile with increasing annual mileage; and car-mile costs by territory classification.
The question of proportionality of cost to miles driven is raised
by Mr. Woll's observation that Dr. Butler "expects a customer who
drives 10,000 miles to have twice the losses of a customer who drives
5,000 miles." This correctly represents how the car-mile unit works if
the cars driven different distances are classified identically (and
have the same coverage).
The proportionality assumed by the current car-year system,
ostensibly for administrative convenience, is that within-class cost is
proportional to the time period the car is insured in units of caryears. This assumption produces widely divergent per mile costs for
cars identically classified. Table 1 illustrates this using Mr. Woll's
5,000 and 10,000 miles per car-year example. The cars driven the two
distances per year are garaged in the same territory and are classified identically by driver (adult unisex) and use (pleasure with limited commuting to work). The premium and per mile costs of 10,000
miles of coverage driven at 5,000 miles per car-year under two
arrangements are compared with the cost of driving 10,000 miles in
one car-year. Three different premiums are paid for 10,000 car-miles
of exposure.
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TABLE 1
Within-Class Variation in Cost of 10,000 Miles Coverage

How 10,000 Miles
are Driven

Territorial
Base
Price per
Car-Year'

1 Car in 2 Years
2 Cars in 1 Year

$500
$500

1 Car in 1 Year

$500

Discount"
Mileage
Mileage
Multicar
None

DiscountAdjusted
Class
Multiplier

Car-Miles

1.00
0.85

$1000
$850

10.0t
B.5t

1.15

$575

5.Bt

Premium
Paid for

10,000

Cost per
Mile
for
Owner

, Assumed value
" Deductions from the class multiplier: -0.15 for estimated future mileage less than 7500 miles;
-0.15 for two or more cars on policy. From the Pennsylvania manual of State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance, effective 5/15/92

Table 1 shows that factors not directly related to risk, such as
number of cars in a household and how intensively they are used
within time periods, determine large differences in what is charged
per mile of exposure to risk of loss for cars in the same territory and
driver risk class.
The requirement endorsed by Mr. Woll that the number of price
units should be proportional to expected losses, other risk factors
being equal, leads to the absurd conclusion that insurers currently
expect a customer who drives 10,000 miles over two years or in two
cars in one year to have approximately twice the losses as a customer
driving one car the same distance in one year.
Mr. Woll raises the issue of decreasing claims per mile with
increasing annual mileage by presenting Allstate study data in his
Figure 1. By raising this relationship as an objection to the car-mile
as a price unit, Mr. Woll implies that the same cents-per-mile price
would be applied to all cars and therefore would overcharge the
owners of cars driven more intensively in a year relative to owners of
cars driven much less in a year. This objection, however, ignores the
fact that cents-per-mile prices would depend on each car's risk classification.
As in prior studies with similar results, the results shown in Mr.
Woll's Figure 1 are obtained with data that either are unclassified
or are classified only by driver sex; see Butler, Butler, and Williams
(1988, p. 266). As a consequence, drivers at the extremes of the age
range, who have considerably higher than average accident rates per
mile and also average much less driving, would be over represented
at lower mileages without classification by driver age. (The paper
points out that car-miles of exposure randomly sampled by accidents
would be biased toward the cars of such driver groups.) Concurrently,
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the higher mileage data would be biased to cars used predominantly
on limited access highways with lower accident rates per mile. As
Mr. Woll points out, it is not just miles driven that determine risk
transfer cost, but territory, driver, and use of car, all of which require
risk classification for evaluation. Conversion of class prices from dollars-per-year to cents-per-mile demonstrates this essential relationship.
Table 2 compares the conversions of two existing car-use classes to
cents-per-mile prices. All that is necessary for the conversion is an
average mileage value for the class. At averages assumed for the two
classes, the difference in the cents-per-mile class prices shown in the
table approximate the threefold decrease in per mile claim rates
with the fivefold increase in intensity of car use from 5,000 miles to
25,000 miles per year shown by the Allstate data in Mr. Woll's
Figure 1.
TABLE 2

Car-Mile Prices For Two Use Classes

Class
Pleasure
Business

Territory
Car-Year
Base Price*

$500
$500

Multiplier**
.95

1.40

CarYear
Price

Average
Miles per
Car-Year*

Calculated
Price per
Car-Mile

$475
$700

5,000
25,000

9.5t
2.8t

* Assumed values
** Adult unisex driver class. Multipliers from the California manual of State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance, effective 1/15/91

What determines per-mile risk for a car is not the number of
miles it is driven within an arbitrary time period (one year), but the
average conditions under which the driving is done. Although intensity of car use may correlate with driver age and car use, classification is essential to determine the cost of insurance coverage per carmile for any set of driving conditions. The car-mile unit for measuring
the cost of risk transfer is also essential to meaningful territorial
classifica tion.
As though the car-mile were a classification variable, Mr. Woll
states that "[W]e find that mileage is a relativel} unimportant
source of difference between customers compared to territory." An
example shows, however, that classification by territory depends on
the car-mile exposure unit-as distinct from mileage classificationto have meaning for individual risk transfer. Table 3 shows the
dollars per car-year prices for a high priced territory and a low
priced territory in California for cars in the same driver and use
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class. The ratio of high to low prices per car-year is 4.4, presumably
representing the greater traffic density in Los Angeles and other
differences in conditions and costs. The cents-per-mile costs for car
owners also is shown in both territories at three mileage amounts.
TABLE 3
Car-Mile Costs by Territory and Miles Driven

California
Territory
13 Northern Counties
Los Angeles City

Car-Year
Price for
High Annual
Mileage*

Car-Mile Cost to Owner by
Miles Car is Driven in Year
3,000**
12,000
20,000

$265

7.6ft

2.U

1.3ft

$1172

33.7ft

9.8ft

5.9ft

* State Farm manual effective 1-15-91. Minimum coverage, adult unisex driver and car use profile from California Insurance Dept.'s 1990 Auto Premium Survey
** Discount for estimated future mileage less than 7,500 miles applied

If it is assumed that the average exposure for the class in both
territories in Table 3 is 12,000 miles per car-year, conversion to the
car-mile unit means that all of the northern counties cars would be
paying 2.2 cents a mile and all of the Los Angeles cars in the class
would be paying nearly 10 cents a mile, thus preserving the difference in territorial risk transfer costs.
In contrast to the differences between territories in cents-per-mile
costs at class average mileages, the northern counties owners of cars
driven 3,000 miles in a year pay more than seven cents a mile while
owners of Los Angeles cars driven 20,000 miles in a year pay less than
six cents a mile. The meaning of difference in risk by territory is lost
if more is paid per mile for individual cars in territories with low
traffic densities than is paid per mile for individual cars in territories with the highest traffic densities.
Mr. Woll devotes a considerable portion of his critique to discussing his study of statistical measures for comparing classifications
of car-year data, citing evaluation methods developed by the
Stanford Research Institute (SRI). Although the SRI study (1976) did
not evaluate the car-mile unit as an alternative to the car-year unit,
a major finding from its empirical study of nine years of individual
driver accident records establishes strong limitations on the ability
of classification by year to distinguish the cost of individual driving
risk. The study corroborates that the most powerful class separation
is driver sex, with men's average accident likelihood per year about
twice the women's average. Despite this large class difference, how-
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ever, the distributions of individual accident likelihoods per year for
men and women completely overlapped, with 13% of women having
likelihoods greater than men's average and 28% of men having likelihoods less than women's average. These overlapping distributions
and averages show characteristics that are similar to the distributions of men's and women's annual mileages in relation to the approximately 2:1 difference in their average miles driven. Eleven percent
of women exceed men's average mileage, and 24% of men drive less
than women's average mileage; see Butler, Butler, and Williams
(1988, p. 396). Individual miles of driving cannot be predicted from
experienced class averages, by driver sex, or in any other way. (See
the paper for the characteristics of individual mileage listed by
Bailey and Simon.) The miles that individual cars are driven, however, are recorded on their odometers as the measure of individual
risk transferred. The expected cents-per-mile cost of risk transfer
depends on statistically reliable actual class experience.
Mr. Woll's discussion of the car-mile price unit as if it were a
classification variable has provided an opportunity to show why the
car-mile exposure unit is essential to meaningful classification for
individual risk transfer. Dollars-per-year prices for example risk
classes that purport to distinguish differences in risk by territory,
driver, and car use show large individual variability in cents-per-carmile costs for reasons not directly related to risk. Therefore, not only
is the car-mile exposure unit essential for cost-based pricing of individual risk transfer, but its use is essential in order for risk classification variables (factors) to have meaning for individual risk.
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